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EDITORIAL
Recent economic data give grounds for 
optimism. Activity in the euro area has 
returned to a solid growth path with GDP 
growing above potential in the first quarter. 
This brings 'hard' activity data back in line 
with 'soft' survey data and confirms that the 
disappointing GDP reading at the end of 
last year was only a technical blip. In other 
words, we can now be more confident that 
the marked improvement in business 
confidence in the last few months really 
reflects a robust underlying momentum in 
the euro-area economy and was not just a 
statistical anomaly.  
Another encouraging development is the 
increasing evidence that the long-awaited 
strengthening of domestic demand is finally 
taking place. Private consumption picked up 
substantially in the first quarter and made a 
significant contribution to growth. 
Consumer spending is underpinned by 
strengthening household confidence, which 
is now well above its long-term average, and 
a gradual firming of the labour market. For 
private investment, the underlying 
momentum is also strong. Growth picked 
up only modestly in the first quarter, with 
poor weather conditions weighing on 
construction, but a sharper acceleration is 
expected for the second quarter. If 
confirmed in the quarters to come, the pick-
up in domestic demand would put growth 
on a stronger footing. 
Overall, recent economic data are in line 
with the Commission services’ spring 
economic forecasts which project GDP 
growth to accelerate to 2.1% in 2006. If 
anything, the strong gains in confidence in 
the past few months suggest that risks to the 
near-term outlook may be tilted to the 
upside.  
Nevertheless, there are also downside risks 
to growth stemming from higher energy 
prices or a possible disorderly correction of 
global imbalances. Recent turbulences in 
global financial markets are an additional 
source of uncertainty. After having risen 
steadily in the first four months of the year, 
equity market indices across the world fell in 
recent weeks. Emerging markets were worst 
affected, with stock markets tumbling by 
about 20% in Turkey, Brazil, India and 
Russia. Heightened investor sensitivity to 
risk has been reflected in investment flows 
out of emerging-market assets, leading also 
to a sizeable increase in bond yields and a 
pronounced fall in exchange rates in these 
countries. By contrast, there has been less 
financial turbulence in industrialised 
economies, with less of a decline in stock 
prices and no significant effect on bond 
prices and exchange rates. Finally, it should 
be noted that among the recently acceded 
Member States, those in ERM II have fared 
better than the others and better than 
emerging market economies in general. This 
suggests that the 'euro umbrella' has 
effectively shielded those countries from 
financial market contagion.  
At this moment, there is no reason for the 
euro area to be overly worried about the 
turbulence on financial markets. The 
increase in volatility has been largely 
confined to equity markets and to financial 
markets in emerging market economies. 
Moreover, the decline of equity prices in 
May can be seen as a correction following 
the "mini-boom" in the preceding few 
months. Nevertheless, there remains a risk 
of a more protracted – and potentially 
disruptive – adjustment in the international 
financial system, especially in the light of the 
persistent global imbalances. Against this 
background, the situation on the financial 
markets requires careful monitoring.  
The strengthening economic activity 
provides a golden opportunity for more 
forceful consolidation of public finances. 
However, our latest assessment gives no 
grounds for complacency. According to the 
Commission services’ spring forecasts, the 
structural government deficit – i.e. 
cyclically-adjusted and net of one-off and 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2006 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
other temporary measures – is projected to 
improve only marginally in 2006, by 0.1% of 
GDP for the euro area as a whole. This falls 
short of the objectives set by Member States 
in their stability programmes. For the entire 
period 2006-07 the Commission projects – 
on an unchanged policy basis – the 
structural deficit to improve only by ¼% of 
GDP, although additional fiscal 
consolidation may happen when 2007 
budgets are prepared. Finally, debt and long-
term sustainability remain a matter of 
concern. In four out of the seven euro-area 
Member States with debt levels above 60% 
of GDP, debt is expected to increase rather 
than decrease between 2005 and 2007.  
Fiscal policy in 2006 and 2007 should apply 
the lessons learned from past mistakes, 
especially the failure to adjust in the last 
period of 'good times' between 1999 and 
2001. Member States should – when 
necessary – make use of benign growth 
conditions, with growth above or close to 
potential, to tighten the fiscal stance in 
order to step up the pace of fiscal 
consolidation.  
Finally, this Quarterly Report examines the 
consequences for the euro area of the 
progressive shift in its production structure 
from goods to services over the past few 
decades. Nowadays, services account for 
70% of employment and value added in the 
euro area. Although there are big differences 
within the services sector, as a whole it is 
characterised by slower labour productivity 
gains and lower competition than in 
manufacturing industry. As a result of these 
two interrelated factors and of temporary 
factors in some Member States, inflation 
tends to be significantly higher for services 
than for non-energy industrial goods. 
Finally, in the euro area, the services sector 
is also an important source of inflation 
persistence and therefore hampers the 
economy's capacity to adapt to shocks.  
It is important to stress that, although partly 
related to the production structure of 
services, these features also reflect past 
policy choices. Hence, while the lack of 
competition in some services sectors is 
related to the limited tradability of many 
services, it also stems from extensive 
national regulation hampering full 
integration and the achievement of a single 
market for services in the euro area. In a 
similar vein, the low growth of labour 
productivity in the services sector is partly 
the consequence of a lack of competition 
and insufficient exploitation of ICT. The US 
experience shows that there is room for 
dynamic services markets that contribute 
both to employment and to strong 
productivity growth. To achieve this, 
however, there is a clear need for policy 
measures that increase competition in and 
integration of the euro-area services 
markets, favour the spread of new 
technologies and enhance human capital. 
The Services Directive is an important step 
in the right direction. Once it is adopted, it 
will be essential to ensure that it is 
transposed rapidly and fully. Given the 
significant difficulties associated with 
measuring services output and prices 
accurately, efforts should also be made to 
improve the quality of data on services.  
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
Since the beginning of the year, the economy has returned to a robust growth path, buttressed by strengthening domestic 
demand. Although investment growth suffered from poor weather conditions in the first months of the year, private 
consumption has shown signs of recovery underpinned by strengthening household confidence and a gradual firming of the 
labour market. Continued improvements in business and consumer confidence in recent months suggest that the upswing could 
surprise on the upside in the next quarters. Overall, the strong growth momentum and broadening recovery in domestic 
demand should allow the economy to weather the negative effects of high oil prices, recent stock market turbulence and the 
moderate appreciation of the euro.  
This report presents a mid-year review of budgetary policy in the euro area. The structural budget balance in the euro area 
improved by about ¾% of GDP in 2005 but prospects for fiscal consolidation in 2006 and 2007 are meagre. According to 
the budgetary plans submitted by Member States in the 2005 updates of their stability programmes, the structural budget 
balance in the euro area was expected to improve further by almost 1% of GDP by 2007. However, the Commission 
services’ spring 2006 forecast signals that the fiscal consolidation targets for 2006 of the stability programmes are at risk in 
half of the Member States. To meet the budgetary consolidation plans in the Stability programmes, 2006 budgetary 
improvements would need to be better than forecast and complemented by ambitious 2007 budgets. When necessary, Member 
States should make use of benign growth conditions, with growth above or close to potential, to tighten the fiscal stance and 
secure a significant fall in the euro-area debt ratio. 
As part of the regular analysis of growth differences within the euro area, this report also looks at recent developments in 
cyclical synchronisation between Member States. The latest data show that the dispersion of Member States' output gaps has 
remained at a historical low in recent years. By contrast, some measures of business cycle correlation suggest tentative signs of 
cyclical desynchronisation in a few Member States since 2004 (Belgium, Greece, Finland and Spain). Careful analysis shows 
that these signs of desynchronisation are generally not a source of concern as they reflect temporary and minor shifts in cycles. 
Nevertheless, they should continue to deserve attention by national policy makers.  
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
Robust and more balanced growth in the first 
quarter 
Following a technical moderation in economic 
growth to a quarter-on-quarter growth rate of 
0.3% in the fourth quarter of 2005, euro-area 
GDP doubled to 0.6% in the first quarter of 
2006, in line with the Commission services' 
spring 2006 economic forecasts. The solid pace 
of growth in the first quarter was corroborated 
by positive signals from consumer and business 
survey data. The underlying growth momentum, 
as measured by the year-on-year growth rate, also 
edged up from 1.7% in the fourth quarter of 
2005 to 1.9% in the first quarter of 2006, the 
second-best reading since the beginning of 2001.  
Regarding the composition of demand, the first 
quarter showed a more balanced picture 
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 22 June 2006. 
compared to the previous quarter, with both 
domestic demand (excl. inventories) and net 
trade marking positive contributions to GDP 
growth of 0.5 pp and 0.3 pp, respectively. 
Inventories, by contrast, subtracted 0.2 pp from 
GDP growth.  
Against a background of an improving labour 
market situation, private consumption grew by 
0.7%. Total employment expanded at an annual 
rate of 1.2% in the fourth quarter of 2005 and 
the first quarter of 2006, the strongest pace of 
expansion since the beginning of the current 
recovery. At the same time, the unemployment 
rate declined to a rate of 8.1% in the first quarter 
of 2006, significantly below the average rate 
recorded in 2005 (8.6%).  
Total fixed investment accelerated only mildly in 
the first quarter (0.3%) from an already subdued 
performance in the previous quarter. Although a 
breakdown of investment between construction 
and equipment is not yet available for the euro 
area as a whole, developments at the Member 
State level indicate that weather-related weakness 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2006 
 
- 6 - 
 
 Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2005 Q2 
2005 
Q3 
2005 
Q4 
2006 
Q1 
Carryover 
to 2006 2006 2007 
 % change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.6 1.2  2.1  1.8 
Private consumption 0.3  0.5  0.1  0.7  1.1  1.7  1.4  
Government consumption 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.5 1.0  2.0  1.2 
Gross fixed capital formation 1.4 1.0 0.2 0.3 1.3  4.2  2.4 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.1  0.6  0.6 
Exports of goods and services 1.5 2.8 0.7 3.1 5.4  5.4  5.3 
Imports of goods and services 2.0 2.9 1.3 2.5 5.5  6.0  4.8 
 % contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6  1.0   0.8  
Government consumption 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2  0.4   0.2  
Gross fixed capital formation 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3  0.9   0.5  
Changes in inventories 0.0 0.0 0.4 -0.2 0.1  0.0   0.0  
Net exports -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.3 0.1  -0.2   0.3  
(1) European Commission Spring 2006 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
in construction investment may have weighed on 
gross fixed capital formation. With the rate of 
capacity utilisation in manufacturing now 
exceeding its long-term average (82%), the 
underlying momentum for investment spending 
appears sound. Investment growth is therefore 
expected to see a rebound in the second quarter. 
Overall, the first quarter provided evidence of a 
stronger, domestic-demand-based recovery 
which, if confirmed in the coming quarters, 
would increase the underlying growth 
momentum of the euro-area economy and which 
has already started to affect the labour market 
positively.  
On the external side, robust global demand 
entailed a strong pick-up in the growth of 
exports of goods and services in the first quarter 
of 2006. Exports grew by 3.1% (q-o-q), 
outweighing growth in imports (2.5% q-o-q). As 
a result, there was a significant positive 
contribution from net exports to growth in the 
first quarter. 
The recovery could surprise on the upside in 
the second quarter  
Available indicators for the second quarter of 
2006 point to a further strengthening of the 
current recovery. Business and consumer surveys 
from the European Commission have improved 
markedly in the last few months. The overall 
economic sentiment indicator – a coincident 
indicator for GDP growth in the euro area – rose 
to an average level of 106.2 in April–May, 
markedly above the first-quarter reading of 102.6.  
 
Graph 1: Consumer confidence, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 1999 to May 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Consumer confidence brightened again in April 
and May, reflecting improvements in 
expectations concerning the general economic 
situation and diminishing concerns about 
unemployment. Given the links between 
consumer confidence and household spending, 
these indications support the view that the 
recovery in private consumption is pursuing its 
course. This picture is in line with developments 
in retail confidence which continued to improve 
in the second quarter, and is now well above its 
long-term average.  The first hard data on retail 
sales for the second quarter also proved 
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 Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2005-2006 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.0 0.00 2.75 52.3 54.5 96.4   -9.5 33.7 
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.1 -1.25 -0.77 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
June 2005 96.1 -0.31 -0.3        49.9         53.1  93.4 -14.3 19.5 
July 2005 97.2 -0.09 0.4        50.8         53.5  96.0 -13.3 37.0 
August 2005 97.5 -0.10 1.3        50.4         53.4  96.0 -11.3 50.0 
September 2005 98.5 0.05 2.0        51.7         54.7  96.7 -7.0 38.6 
October 2005 100.2 0.16 3.0        52.7         54.9  99.5 -6.0 39.4 
November 2005 99.7 0.12 3.6        52.8         55.2  98.4 -5.6 38.7 
December 2005 100.5 0.36 4.0        53.6         56.8  100.4 -0.8 61.6 
January 2006 101.5 0.33 4.4        53.5         57.0  103.9 -4.4 71.0 
February 2006 102.7 0.60 4.9        54.5         58.2  104.9 1.6 69.8 
March 2006 103.6 0.81 4.9        56.1         58.2  105.7 0.3 63.4 
April 2006 105.7 1.16 5.1        56.7         58.3  105.5 6.4 62.7 
May 2006 106.7 1.06         57.0         58.7  104.0 1.4 50.0 
June 2006           37.8 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six monthly 
change. 4) Reuters Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, 
West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market analysts, Germany. 
encouraging, with a pick-up of year-on-year 
growth to 2.8% in April. 
 
Industrial confidence climbed in May to the 
highest level observed since December 2000. The 
stronger assessment in the order books 
component and the surge in production 
expectations in April–May 2006 compared to the 
first quarter of the year suggest that the recovery 
in the euro area is gathering pace. This is also 
suggested by Reuters PMI index for 
manufacturing activity, the current level of which 
is indicative of industrial production expanding at 
its fastest pace since the year 2000. Furthermore, 
the employment component of the PMI for the 
manufacturing sector indicates that firms in the 
manufacturing sector may have begun to increase 
employment.  
After a good showing in the first quarter, some 
hard data for the manufacturing sector came in 
somewhat weaker than expected in April. 
Industrial production and new orders both fell 
compared with the previous months (by 0.6% 
and 0.2% respectively). However, the drop in 
industrial production comes after 6 months of 
steady increases and is at odds with the 
continuous improvement in the assessment of 
production by manufacturers in surveys. 
Furthermore, new orders increased strongly in 
April once the volatile transport equipment 
sector is excluded, suggesting that the underlying 
momentum remains solid.  
Graph 2: Business confidence indicators, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 1999 to May 2006) 
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(1) Normalised. 
Source: Commission services. 
Survey data provide an upbeat outlook for the 
services sector. Following a substantial 
improvement in April–May, the services 
confidence indicator reached a level last attained 
five years ago. The recent improvement has been 
broad-based with all components of the service 
index showing gains. Similarly, Reuters index for 
services also strengthened in the first two 
months of the second quarter, reflecting a broad-
based improvement across components and, in 
particular, an upbeat assessment of incoming 
new business along with a significant increase in 
the employment component.   
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On the external side, still robust world growth 
should support exports. This is also suggested by 
the assessment of export order books in the 
euro-area manufacturing sector, which remains at 
its highest level in more than five years. Global 
PMI indicators also confirm strong momentum 
in the second quarter, despite some weakening in 
US growth.  
The appreciation of the euro exchange rate – by 
about 2.5% in nominal effective terms since the 
beginning of the year – has reversed part of the 
depreciation in 2005, implying some renewed 
pressure on the market shares of euro-area 
exporters. However, with unit labour costs 
growing more slowly in the euro area than in the 
economies of its main trading partners, the 
potential negative effects of the recent 
deterioration in the nominal effective exchange 
rate on the export performance of the euro area 
should be attenuated.   
The economy is in a good position to 
weather the latest rise in oil prices  
Following a brief respite after the previous highs 
reached in September 2005 due to hurricanes in 
the Mexican Gulf region, oil prices have resumed 
their upward path in the first half of 2006, 
reaching new record highs, in nominal terms, of 
around 74 USD/bl. Since mid-April the spot 
price of Brent oil has hovered in the 66 to 
74 USD/bl range and stood at about 70 USD/bl 
on 22 June. The appreciation of the euro against 
the US dollar since the beginning of the year has, 
however, dampened significantly the oil price 
increase in euro terms.  
Supply concerns following disruptions to 
Nigerian oil production and geopolitical 
uncertainty surrounding the Middle East region, 
in particular Iran and Iraq, have been the main 
drivers of the recent increases. Low excess 
refinery capacity has added further pressure on 
the price of petrol and other refined products. 
Moreover, the demand for oil continues to be 
buoyed by robust global GDP growth, with oil 
demand projected by the International Energy 
Agency to grow around 1.4% in 2006. 
Graph 3: Oil price developments - Brent 
(Jan 2001 – June 2006, daily data)  
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Source: Commission services. 
Based on these developments, futures prices 
indicate that the oil price will remain elevated in 
2007 and 2008. At the beginning of June, the 
average price of Brent crude for delivery in 2007 
was 74 USD/bl, corresponding to a jump of 
roughly 10 USD/bl compared to the level at the 
beginning of the year. 
It is clear that high oil prices have lowered 
growth in the euro area, denting households' real 
disposable income and weighing on corporate 
profitability. Simulations carried out with 
DG ECFIN's Quest model suggest that a 
permanent 10 USD increase in oil prices reduces 
GDP growth in the euro area by 0.3 pp in the 
first year and by 0.1 pp in the second and third 
years. The oil price rise would also lift inflation 
by 0.2 pp in both the first and second year.  
However, the euro area has coped relatively well 
with higher oil prices so far and the economy's 
momentum should allow it to contain their 
negative impact on growth. Business and 
consumer sentiment does not seem to have been 
overly affected. Second-round effects via wages 
have not materialised, so that core inflation 
remains well below 2%. Besides, it should be 
stressed that most of the recent increase in oil 
prices was actually already factored into the 
Commission spring 2006 forecast. The forecast 
was based on an assumption of an average price 
of Brent crude oil of 71 USD/bl. in 2007, which 
is in line with current levels and only slightly 
lower than futures prices.  
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Short-term growth outlook and risks 
Despite the impact of higher oil prices and the 
recent appreciation of the euro, the indications 
are that the euro-area economy should 
experience robust growth, at or above potential, 
throughout 2006. DG ECFIN's dynamic factor 
model for quarterly GDP growth in the euro area 
projects a range of 0.5% to 0.9% for GDP 
growth in the second and third quarter of 2006.  
These projections, reflecting the continued 
strong business survey indicators, suggest that 
there may be upside risks to short-term growth 
prospects and, in particular, to the Commission 
spring forecast for GDP in 2006 (2.1%). 
Downside risks to growth stem from higher 
commodity prices, rising interest rates and the 
recent increase in uncertainty in financial 
markets, but these are outweighed in the short 
term by the relatively robust momentum. 
Graph 4: GDP growth in the euro area 
(Q-o-q changes in %) 
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(1) Confidence level: 68% (+/- one standard deviation of past 
forecast errors). 
Source: Commission services. 
In 2007, growth is likely to temporarily slow 
down somewhat, mainly due to the effect of the 
planned budgetary measures in Germany which 
will induce German households to shift part of 
their consumption and housing investment from 
2007 to 2006.  
In addition, the risks to growth appear greater 
and more tilted to the downside for 2007. In 
particular, oil price increases above those already 
assumed cannot be ruled out, given the very low 
spare capacity and continued geopolitical risks. 
Furthermore, while the resulting inflationary 
pressures have so far been kept in check, greater 
indirect effects as well as second-round effects 
on wages could yet emerge. Similarly, disorderly 
exchange rates adjustments vis-à-vis the euro 
resulting form the unwinding of global current 
account imbalances would imply a downside risk 
to the growth outlook for the euro area.   
Finally, there are also downside risks related to 
the recent stock market turbulence. The slide in 
stock prices since May has mostly eliminated 
gains recorded since the beginning of the year 
and may be seen as a correction following the 
"mini-boom" of the preceding few months. If 
this interpretation is correct, the recent episode 
in financial-market turbulence is simply a one-off 
event which should have only a limited impact 
on growth. However, it could also mark the 
beginning of a more protracted adjustment in 
international financial markets in a context of 
large global imbalances. In this case, it could 
prove to be significantly more disruptive for the 
euro-area economy. 
Oil prices continue to exert upward pressure 
on inflation 
Headline inflation has remained above 2% since 
the beginning of 2005. It eased slightly during the 
first quarter of 2006 but was again on a moderate 
upward path in the past two months, climbing to 
2.5% in May (Graph 5). Measures of core 
inflation have also edged up in the past few 
months but the increase has remained modest. 
The rather large gap that has emerged between 
headline and core inflation since 2005 is to a 
large extent due to the strong direct impact of oil 
price rises on the HICP index through its energy 
component. Energy inflation has made an 
increasingly strong impact on headline inflation 
over the past year, currently contributing about 
1 pp to overall headline inflation. The other main 
contributor to inflation is the services sector 
which, over the last few years, has made a 
persistently large contribution also of about 1 pp  
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Box 1: What constitutes a 'good' measure of core inflation? 
 
In striving to achieve price stability over the medium term, central banks face the difficulty of interpreting monthly 
movements in the inflation rate. Consumer price indices, like the HICP, contain a vast number of goods and 
services, some of which are subject to large and frequent price fluctuations. When such fluctuations are sufficiently 
large to affect the aggregate HICP, they can hinder the understanding of underlying price developments. Therefore, 
several measures of "core" inflation have been developed. While economic researchers have not been able to agree 
on one preferred measure of core inflation, 1 there is agreement that a good measure of core inflation should be 
transparent, able to predict future headline inflation and possible to estimate in a timely fashion.2 
For the euro area, the most common measure of core inflation is HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy. 
Although this core inflation measure has a clear advantage in terms of transparency and timely estimation, the degree 
to which it accurately reflects future headline inflation is unclear. Firstly, since January 1999, the standard deviation 
of monthly inflation rates was almost the same for both headline HICP and HICP excluding food and energy. 
Secondly, the appropriateness of this measure is called into question by the fact that the same structural factors, 
related to increasing globalization (the “China effect”), that put upward pressures on energy prices are also holding 
back some core inflation components (e.g. non-energy industrial goods). Looking at one element but not at the other 
could provide a distorted view of the inflationary outlook, reducing the value of this core inflation indicator as a 
measure of underlying inflation trends. Finally, regression analysis shows that for the euro area HICP excluding 
unprocessed food and energy has hardly any predictive power for future headline inflation (see table). It even lagged 
headline inflation over the period between the second half of 1999 and 2002. This is in contrast with the experience 
of the US, where this measure of core inflation appears to have some predictive power, although also in the US there 
were periods in which core inflation lagged headline inflation. 
Rather than assuming that a few goods always have the largest price fluctuations, trimmed mean measures of core 
inflation exclude a certain percentage (e.g. 15 percent) of the items showing the most extreme inflation rates. An 
arithmetic mean is calculated for the remaining components of the index. While the trimmed mean measure 
performs slightly better than the HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy as a leading indicator for headline 
HICP inflation, its predictive power is also negligible. 
 
A third measure of core inflation, the weighted median, is obtained by arranging the inflation rates of each sub-
category of the HICP index in ascending order, with their cumulated weights, and identifying the rate that is at the 
50th percentile. For the euro area, this measure of core inflation appears to have some limited predictive power for 
headline inflation over the period of observation and is comparable to CPI excluding energy and food in the US. 
This suggests that, while some measures are better at predicting future inflation prospects than others, no one 
measure of core inflation can be regarded as a "good" indicator of the underlying level of inflation. 
 
The predictive power of a number of measures of core inflation for headline inflation,  
euro area and United States (Jan 1999 to Apr 2006) # 
 
HICP excl. 
Weighted median 
- 10 -  
 energy and CPI excl. energy and Trimmed mean (EA)unprocessed food 
(EA) 
(EA) food (US) 
c 0.23*** (0.07) 
0.29*** 
(0.08) 
0.46*** 0.46*** 
(0.08) (0.11) 
β 0.18 (0.12) 
0.47** 
(0.20) 
0.81*** 0.64*** 
(0.17) (0.11) 
Adj-R-Squared 0.02 0.06 0.23 0.17 
AIC 1.61 1.57 1.37 2.97 
SC 1.67 1.63 1.43 3.03 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Values in brackets are standard errors.  
#   Regressions take the following form: pt+12 – pt = c + β (pt core - pt),   where p denotes headline inflation (HICP 
for the euro area and CPI for the USA) and p core denotes one of the core inflation measures. 
 
1   For more detailed analyses on core inflation measures, see Rich, R. and C. Steindel (2005), 'A review of core inflation and an 
evaluation of its measures', Federal reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, No. 236, December. 
2   See also ECB (2005), 'Diverse patterns in headline and underlying inflation', Monthly Bulletin, November. 
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Graph 5: Headline and core inflation 
 (Y-o-y changes in % – Jan 2004 to May 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
to headline inflation. The three remaining 
categories, processed food, unprocessed food 
and non-energy industrial goods, have only had a 
minor impact on inflation developments. In 
particular, inflation in non-energy industrial 
goods has fallen to very low levels compared to 
previous years as a result of intense competition 
in this sector within the EU and from emerging 
markets as well as still relatively weak domestic 
demand. 
Graph 6: Contributions to headline inflation 
 (Y-o-y changes in % – Jan 2005 to May 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The recent modest pick-up in core inflation 
measures, together with that in producer prices 
for consumer goods and intermediate goods, 
indicates that the effects of higher energy prices 
are starting to be passed on to other sectors of 
the economy. There are also signs of a build-up 
of pipeline price pressures in business surveys. 
As yet, second-round effects in the form of 
increased wage demands have not emerged. The 
current annual growth rate for compensation per 
employee and negotiated wages, at about 2%, is 
in line with developments over the last three 
years. However, as economic growth gathers 
pace, the risk of second-round effects increases. 
The Commission services' spring 2006 forecasts 
project headline inflation to remain above 2% 
over the next two years (2.2% in both 2006 and 
2007), as do the latest forecasts by other 
international organisations such as the ECB, the 
OECD and the IMF. The risks to the outlook 
for inflation are mainly on the upside and pertain 
to higher-than-expected direct and indirect 
effects of oil price rises, the emergence of 
second-round effects and further unexpected 
increases in indirect taxes and administered 
prices. Downside risks include lower-than-
expected oil prices and weaker-than-expected 
GDP growth. 
Graph 7: Inflation expectations 
(Jan 2004 to May 2006) 
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(1) As embedded in euro-area index-linked bonds. 
(2) EU Consumer survey – price trend over the next 12 months. 
Source: Commission services. 
These forecasts are in line with current 
expectations of inflation. Inflationary 
expectations have been on an upward path for 
some time now. Short-term inflationary 
expectations, as measured by the European 
Commission's Consumer Surveys, have been 
rising since the beginning of 2005 and have 
registered a sharp increase in May. Long-term 
inflationary expectations, derived from index-
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linked bonds, have risen modestly from about 
2% in mid-2005 to a current level of 2.2%. The 
ECB surveys of professional forecasters also 
show slightly rising expectations in the medium 
term, although longer-run expectations remain 
anchored below 2%. 
Monetary and financial conditions 
Monetary conditions in the euro area, as 
measured by the Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI), have slightly tightened over the last few 
months, driven by the exchange rate appreciation 
and the increase in real short-term interest rates. 
However, despite the three ECB rate hikes since 
December 2005, nominal and real short-term 
interest rates remain low by historical standards, 
and liquidity in the euro area remains ample by all 
plausible measures. 
Graph 8: The euro-area MCI and its contributors 
(Inverted scale – Jan 1999 to May 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
On 8 June, the ECB increased its policy rates 
further by 25 basis points, bringing its main 
policy rate to 2.75%. The decision to hike 
interest rates reflected the upside risks to price 
stability over the medium term indicated by both 
the economic and monetary analysis. The rate 
hike should help anchor medium- to long-term 
inflation expectations in the euro area. Financial 
markets' future contracts are pricing in another 
rate hike by 25 basis points by September and a 
high probability of another 25-basis-point hike 
before the end of the year. This would bring the 
ECB’s policy rate to 3.25%.  
Over the last few months, government bond 
yields in the euro area have continued the gradual 
increase which started at the end of last year. 
Mid-May, 10-year-government bond yields rose 
above 4% for the first time since October 2004. 
The driving forces behind the upturn of 
government bond yields were positive data 
releases that fuelled economic sentiment and 
increased inflation expectations that led to 
further rate hike speculations. At the same time, 
bond yields in the USA moved almost in parallel, 
driven by speculations about further monetary 
tightening caused by inflation fears.  
Graph 9: 10-year government bond yield 
(1 Jan 2005 to 22 June 2006) 
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Source: Ecowin. 
 
Graph 10: Euro exchange rates 
(1 Jan 2005 to 22 June 2006) 
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Source: Ecowin. 
The euro has gradually appreciated since the 
beginning of the year. It gained 9% against the 
dollar, climbing from 1.18 USD to around 1.29 
USD in early June. The most recent 
strengthening was triggered by a change in 
interest rate expectations but it gained 
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Box 2: Stormy spring for financial markets 
 
Sell-off in global stock markets… 
 
After reaching the highest levels in five years in early May, global stock markets recorded sharp declines in the 
following weeks, with the most pronounced losses taking place in emerging economies. The correction in global 
equity prices reflects investor concern about inflation risk in the US economy and the possible need for the Federal 
Reserve to tighten monetary policy by more than had been discounted by investors. The prospect of slower US 
economic growth amid a more sizeable withdrawal of liquidity (and by extension lower growth in the global 
economy) focused investors' attention on risk exposure. The initial correction in stock markets was partially reversed 
in the following trading days as investors hunted for bargains. Nevertheless, investors remained nervous and prices  
volatile, and the stock market correction continued 
until mid-June, followed by some rebound in recent 
days. Between early May and 22 June, major stock 
markets lost between 5% (Dow Jones) and 13% 
(Nikkei). The EuroSTOXX50 lost about 8% in the 
same period. However, the global price correction was 
most pronounced in the stock markets of the emerging 
economies, with Russia and Turkey down by more than 
20%, and Brazil and India down by 16%. Among the 
recently acceded Member States, those participating in 
ERM II fared better than other emerging market 
economies. Non-ERM II countries, however, were hit 
as hard by the stock market correction as other 
emerging market economies and saw their stock indices 
decline by around 15%. It is noteworthy that, alone of 
all EU countries, Slovenia was almost immune to the 
stock market sell-off. After initial losses in the first half 
of May, by mid-June the Slovenian stock market was 
above its early-May level. This may reflect the country's 
expected euro adoption in January 2007. 
 
 
Changes in exchange rates and equity prices  
(Between 2 May and 22 June 2006 – in %) 
 Exchange rate Equity markets 
 (vs. US dollar) (1)  
Turkey -26.2 -22.9 
Brazil -8 -16.3 
Indonesia -6.7 -11.7 
Russia 1.0 -21.1 
India -2.6 -15.9 
Hungary -6.4 -19.7 
Poland -5.3 -15.5 
Czech Republic -1.0 -11.7 
ERM II (ex SI) -0.3 (2) -9.0 
   
Euro area -0.6 -8.2 
(1) Negative sign indicates a depreciation. 
(2) vs. euro. 
Source: Ecowin and Commission services. 
 
Stock indices  
(Index 1 Jan 2003=100 – 1 Jan 2003 to 22 June 2006) 
Nominal effective exchange rate  
(broad group of 41countries) 
(Double export weights – Index 1 Jan 2003=100 
1 Jan 2003 to 22 June 2006) 
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Sources: Ecowin and Commission services. Source: Commission services. 
 
…left G3 currencies almost unaffected… 
 
G3 currencies were only marginally affected by the stock market correction. The euro fluctuated between 1.27 USD 
and 1.29 USD during the stock market sell-off. Against the Japanese yen, the euro lost some 2% in the first half of 
May. These losses were more than reversed in the remainder of May and the JPY/EUR rate is currently some 1% 
above its early-May level. In nominal effective terms (against 29 trading partners), the euro and the yen gained some 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2006 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
1% in the course of May, while the US dollar remained virtually unchanged. In the course of June, the yen gave away 
its gains, while the US dollar strengthened slightly. 
 
…but a number of high-yielding currencies were hit hard 
 
As the sharp reversal in emerging stock markets was driven by a rise in global risk aversion, emerging market bond 
spreads also went up by some 50 basis points in the course of May, but are still low by historical standards. While 
currency losses were relatively mild in some emerging markets (e.g. India, Hong Kong, Mexico and Russia), a 
number of other high-yielding currencies were hit hard. The Indonesian rupiah has lost almost 7% against the US 
dollar. Bird flu worries seemed to have contributed to the depreciation. The Brazilian real has declined by around 8% 
against the US dollar since early May. The Turkish lira recorded the highest losses against the US dollar and is 
currently trading more than 26% below its early May level. Country-specific concerns about domestic inflation rates 
and current account deficits seem to have contributed to exchange rate pressures in these countries.  
 
Interpretations of sell-off still vary 
 
The correction in equity markets was not a complete surprise. The heavy capital inflows into equities in the months 
before May had occurred against a background of a progressive withdrawal of liquidity by the main central banks. 
Some readjustment was always a possibility, as tighter monetary conditions made investors more sensitive to risk. 
However, market commentators differ in the analysis of the causes of the correction and the outlook for stock 
prices. Some argue that price declines are a healthy correction as valuations had become particularly stretched in after 
a rally of more than three years in which for example the EuroStoxx50 almost doubled. Even after the significant 
correction, major stock indices are still around their end-2005 levels. Other commentators are less sanguine and 
highlight global imbalances and compressed credit-risk spreads as the backdrop to the market correction. In the view 
of the pessimists, this could be the beginning of the long-anticipated adjustment in international financial markets. 
On balance, however, it is too early to reach a definitive judgement on the significance of recent equity market 
developments. The crucial question is whether the recent episode in financial-market turbulence is simply a one-off 
event or the beginning of a more protracted – and potentially disruptive – adjustment in the international financial 
system. For the time being, the correction is largely an equity-market event, but any evidence of more marked 
contagion into other markets would be a cause for concern. 
 
momentum after the World Bank-IMF spring 
Meetings in Washington in April which 
reawakened financial markets' concerns about 
global imbalances. Since then, a combination of 
both factors seems to have contributed to short-
term volatility in the dollar-euro exchange rate. 
In recent weeks, a changed market view on 
monetary policy in the US, driven by inflation 
fears, has re-strengthened the US dollar and 
brought the bilateral USD/EUR rate back to 
1.26.  
Table 3: Changes in nominal exchange rate  
(in %) 
22 June 
compared 
with: 
USD/EUR JPY/EUR 
NEER 
euro area 
IC41 
1 Jan 06 6.4 4.2 3.5 
Avg 2005 1.2 6.3 1.1 
Avg. 1995-
2005 12.5 14.45 14.8 
Source: Commission services, EcoWin. 
 
In effective terms, however, the euro's 
appreciation was much less pronounced than its 
bilateral appreciation against the dollar. In 
nominal effective terms, the euro has appreciated 
by 3.5% since the beginning of the year and 
stands around 15% above its 1995-2005 average. 
In real effective terms (deflated by consumer 
prices), the euro is slightly above its 1980-2005 
average.  
May and June were turbulent months for 
financial markets (see Box 2 for a detailed 
discussion). After reaching a five-year high in 
early May, global stock markets experienced a 
serious downward correction. The sell-off in 
stock markets has been reflected, to a lesser 
extent, in developments in foreign exchange 
markets where trading has been characterised by 
a general flight to quality and profit-taking. A 
flight to  quality was also reflected in long-term 
bond yields in both the euro area and the USA, 
which temporarily declined by some 10 basis 
points in the first two weeks of May. After some 
temporary relaxation, the sell-off continued in 
the first weeks of June. 
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2. A mid-year review of budgetary policy 
in the euro area 
Revenues explain better-than-expected 
deficit outturn in 2005 
Following several years of negative surprises vis-
à-vis forecasts, in 2005 public finances fared 
better than expected.  The general government 
budget balance in the euro area posted a deficit 
of 2.4% of GDP, half a percentage point lower 
than expected some five months earlier in the 
Commission services' 2005 autumn forecast. 
Adjusted for cyclical effects and one-off 
measures, the structural budget balance 
improved by ¾ of a percentage point, which is 
the largest improvement since 1997. The better-
than-expected deficit outturn in the euro area as 
a whole in 2005 can mainly be attributed to 
revenues. Adjusted for the impact of statistical 
revisions to GDP, revenues turned out 0.4 pp 
higher than forecast while expenditures were 
0.1 pp point lower than expected. (See Box 3). 
Box 3: Revenues explain better-than-expected deficit outturn in 2005 
 
As shown in the table below, the better-than-expected deficit outturn for 2005 is the result of a lower-than-expected 
revenue ratio being more than offset by a significantly lower-than-expected expenditure ratio. Hence, at first sight 
the story behind the positive surprise would seem to be that restrained expenditure dynamics made up for revenues 
that did not keep pace with the level of economic activity. 
 
However, a closer look at the nominator and denominator of the expenditure and revenue ratios leads to a different 
conclusion. In absolute terms, the total amount of revenues accrued to the general government sector in the euro 
area in 2005 was actually some € 26 billion (0.3% of GDP) higher than projected in autumn, while total expenditure 
turned out 'only' around € 8 billion below the forecast level. Meanwhile, the level of nominal GDP was revised 
significantly upwards and tuned out to be 1.5% higher than projected last autumn. This level shift does not reflect 
stronger-than-expected economic growth or higher-than-expected inflation - the growth rate of nominal GDP 
remained essentially unchanged between autumn and now. It is in fact entirely due to statistical revisions which have 
been made between autumn and now. The mechanical effects of these statistical revisions of the GDP level on both 
the revenue and expenditure ratios are necessarily the same (around -0.7% percentage point – see last column of the 
table). They have therefore no impact on the 2005 deficit ratio but make comparisons between the actual revenue 
and expenditure ratios and those projected in autumn more complicated.  
In conclusion, the better-than-expected deficit outturn in the euro area as a whole in 2005 can be mainly attributed 
to revenues. Adjusted for the impact of technical/statistical revisions to GDP, revenues turned out 0.4% higher than 
forecast while expenditures were 0.1% lower than expected. 
Commission services' forecast vs. outturn, euro area 2005 
Autumn 2005 
(1) 
Outturn 
(2) 
Difference 
(2)–(1) 
Effect of level 
shift in nominal 
GDP on ratio (1)  
% of 
GDP 
Levels 
(bil. €) 
% 
ch. 
% 
of GDP 
Levels 
(bil. €) 
% 
ch. 
% 
of GDP 
Levels 
(bil. €) %  
Total 
revenue 45.5 3581.6  45.1 3607.8  -0.3 26.0 -0.7 
Total 
expend. 48.4 3807.4  47.5 3799.8  -0.8 -7.6 -0.7 
Budget 
balance -2.9 -225.8  -2.4 -192.1  0.5 33.8 0.0 
GDP  7873.5 3.1  7991.3 3.0 1.5 117.7  
(1) Calculated as (ratio) x (% change in nom. GDP level). 
Source: Commission services. 
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Limited consolidation in 2006 and 2007 
The 2005 updates of the stability programmes, 
which were submitted before the better-than-
expected 2005 outturn was known, continued the 
trend of previous years, shifting the adjustment 
paths for the general government balance further 
into the future (Graph 11).  
Graph 11: Nominal budget balances in the euro area: 
evolution in projections in the successive (1999-2005) 
updates of the stability programmes (In % of GDP) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In the past, the failure to meet budget and debt 
targets over the years could be partly attributed 
to a misjudgement of cyclical conditions as well 
as overestimation of potential growth, which led 
to higher-than-projected structural deficits. In 
large part, however, it was also attributable to 
fiscal slippage.  
Addressing the failure to make progress towards 
the medium-term objectives (MTOs)2 was one of 
the main objectives of the 2005 Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) reform. The March 2005 
Council report on strengthening the 
implementation of the SGP states that ‘The past 
failure to reach the medium-term budgetary objective of 
‘close to balance or in surplus’ calls for a strengthening of 
the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
through a renewed commitment by Member States to take 
                                                     
2  The medium-term budgetary objective is set by the 
Member States to ensure a sufficient safety margin with 
respect to the 3 percent of GDP reference value and to 
ensure medium and long-term sustainability of public 
finances. It is measured in structural terms, i.e. cyclically-
adjusted, net of one-off and temporary measures. 
the budgetary action necessary to converge towards this 
objective and respect it’. It also states that ‘Member 
States that have not yet reached their MTO should take 
steps to achieve it over the cycle. Their adjustment effort 
should be higher in good times; it could be more limited in 
bad times. In order to reach their MTO, Member States 
of the euro zone or of ERM-II should pursue an annual 
adjustment in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-offs and 
other temporary measures, of 0.5% of GDP as a 
benchmark.’ For countries in the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP), the requirement set in the 
corrective arm of the SGP is stricter: ‘As a 
benchmark, countries in excessive deficit will be required 
to achieve an annual minimum fiscal effort of at least 
0.5% of GDP in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off 
measures (…)’. 
Now, one year after the reform of the Pact, 
several Member States are not following the key 
principles that were agreed last year. In particular, 
some which have achieved their MTO seem to 
be following pro-cyclical fiscal policies while 
others not yet at their MTO are not pursuing an 
annual structural adjustment of at least ½% of 
GDP. This runs against the spirit and the letter 
of the reform of the preventive part of the Pact. 
The Council Opinions on the 2005 updates 
already reflected concern about the degree of 
back-loading of fiscal efforts and about the fiscal 
relaxation and lack of ambition in 2006. The 
more recent projections of the Commission 
services’ spring 2006 forecast signal that the fiscal 
consolidation targets for 2006 of the stability 
programmes are at risk in half of the Member 
States. In order to change the trend of further 
shifting out the adjustment paths towards the 
MTOs, the 2006 budgetary improvements would 
need to be better than forecast and 
complemented by ambitious 2007 budgets.  
Graph 12 looks at the budgetary developments in 
different groups of euro-area Member States. 
The Member States are grouped according to 
their budgetary situation. It shows that:  
(i) A large deterioration in the structural balance 
(i.e. cyclically adjusted balances net of one-off 
and temporary measures) is forecast in 2006 in 
'countries which are already at the MTO'. This, 
however, reflects in particular the large 
deterioration (between 1 and 1½ % of GDP) of 
the structural balance in Ireland and the 
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Netherlands, reversing improvements of a similar 
order in 2005 which were partly due to 
exceptional revenues, and as such does not 
reflect a large policy change. In 2007, on the 
basis of the no-policy-change scenario underlying 
the Commission services’ 2006 spring forecast, 
the structural budget balance is expected to 
remain broadly unchanged. In several Member 
States, the 2007 budgets are likely to include 
fiscal consolidation measures, improving the 
outlook for 2007.   
Graph 12: Forecast annual change in the structural 
budget balances, euro-area Member States  
(Spring 2006 forecasts – in percentage points) 
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(1) Projections for 2007 are based on a no policy changes 
assumption.  
Source: Commission services. 
 (ii) 'Member States with a deficit below 3% of 
GDP but which have not reached their medium-
term budgetary objective' also show on average a 
structural deterioration in 2006, by about ¼% of 
GDP. In Austria and Belgium, the deterioration 
is due to fiscal loosening in particular. With no 
further policy changes, in 2007 the countries in 
this group of Member States would on average 
improve their structural balance by ¼% of GDP. 
Additional consolidation measures in the 2007 
budgets are expected to tighten the fiscal stance 
and achieve at least the benchmark improvement 
in the structural balance of 0.5% of GDP.  
(iii) 'Countries in Excessive Deficit Procedure' 
are expected to make the required effort of 0.5% 
of GDP in 2006. For 2007, on the basis of the 
no-policy-change scenario underlying the 
Commission services’ 2006 spring forecast, 
countries in EDP are projected to improve their 
structural balance by ¼% of GDP only. 
Especially in Italy and Portugal significant 
consolidation measures are required to ensure the 
required fiscal efforts and correct the excessive 
deficit by the deadlines set by the Council.    
Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions 
Having been clearly expansionary in 2001 and 
2002, the fiscal stance was broadly neutral 
between 2002 and 2004, before tightening 
significantly in 2005. The CAPB improved 
particularly sharply in the Netherlands, Greece, 
Spain and France and, to a lesser extent, also in 
Finland and Germany. According to the 
Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast, the 
fiscal stance is projected to return to broadly 
neutral in 2006 (and, on a no-policy change basis, 
in 2007) as a result of some tightening in 
countries in EDP and fiscal loosening in some 
other euro-area Member States. Member States 
are not making use of growth above or close to 
potential to tighten the fiscal stance and speed up 
fiscal consolidation, even though lessons from 
the past show that windfall revenues should be 
used for deficit and debt reduction.  
General government debt developments in 
the euro area 
The Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast 
foresees a decline in the debt ratio from 70.8% to 
70.5% of GDP in 2006 and, under the no-policy-
change assumption, to 70.1% in 2007, helped by 
high growth and inflation and the better-than-
expected deficit outturn for 2005. This would be 
the first decline in the euro-area debt ratio since 
2002. Still, ambitious budgetary consolidation 
and decisive progress towards the medium-term 
budgetary objectives over the next few years are 
required to sustain and speed up the trend of 
debt reduction and thereby prepare for the 
budgetary costs of ageing populations.   
The aggregate debt projections in the spring 2006 
forecast hide important differences across 
countries. In Greece and Italy, government debt 
ratios are expected to remain above 100% of 
GDP according to both their respective stability 
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programmes and the spring forecast. Belgium 
reduced its debt below this level in 2003 and its 
debt ratio is expected to be reduced further in 
the future thanks to continued significant 
primary surpluses. Four other euro-area Member 
States recorded debt ratios above 60% of GDP 
in 2005 (Germany, France, Austria and Portugal). 
According to the Commission services' spring 
2006 forecast, of the seven euro-area Member 
States with debt levels above 60% of GDP, 
Germany, Portugal, France and Italy are expected 
to record increases in their level between 2005 
and 2007.  
Concluding remarks 
In 2005, the structural budget balance in the euro 
area improved significantly more than expected, 
by about ¾% of GDP, which is the largest 
improvement since 1997. According to the 
budgetary plans that the Member States have 
submitted in their stability programmes, the 
structural budget balance in the euro area as a 
whole was expected to improve further by almost 
1% of GDP from 2005 until 2007. However, 
recent evidence paints a much less upbeat picture  
of budgetary consolidation in the euro area. The 
Commission services’ spring 2006 forecasts 
signal that the fiscal consolidation targets for 
2006 of the stability programmes are at risk in 
half of the Member States. To meet the 
budgetary consolidation plans in the Stability 
programmes, 2006 budgetary improvements 
would need to be better than forecast and 
complemented by ambitious 2007 budgets. 
Speeding up progress towards the medium-term 
budgetary objectives while growth conditions are 
benign, with growth above or close to potential, 
will allow the full play of automatic stabilisers 
during the next downswing. Lessons from the 
past show that windfall revenues should be used 
for deficit and debt reduction. More ambitious 
fiscal restraint in the current benign economic 
environment could also reduce or postpone the 
need for increases in interest rates. In turn, this 
would make it easier for Member States with 
high debt levels to accomplish the necessary 
fiscal consolidation which is essential in the light 
of the upcoming budgetary challenge of 
population ageing. 
.
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3.  Cyclical synchronisation within the 
euro area: what do recent data tell us?  
A high degree of business cycle synchronisation 
between Member States is critical for a smooth 
functioning of EMU. It facilitates the co-
ordination of economic policies and, in 
particular, the conduct of a common monetary 
policy. It is therefore important to regularly 
monitor the issue of cyclical synchronisation and 
indeed it has already been analysed on two 
occasions in the Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area.3 These studies concluded that Member 
States' business cycles were relatively closely 
aligned and that the dispersion in output gaps 
within the euro area had tended to narrow since 
the 1990s.  
The issue of cyclical synchronisation within the 
euro area has recently also received considerable 
attention in the academic literature. There is a 
certain consensus in the empirical literature that 
euro-area business cycles are closely aligned. 
Giannone and Reichlin (2006), for instance, 
show that turning points in national business 
cycles have shown a remarkable degree of 
simultaneity since 1970.4 However, available 
evidence on the existence of a cyclical 
convergence process (i.e. an increase in 
synchronisation over time) is more controversial. 
On the one hand, Darvas and Szapáry (2005) 
show that the business cycles of euro-area 
Member States have become more synchronised 
over time, particularly since 1993 (the start of the 
run-up to EMU).5 De Brandt, Bruneau and 
Flageollet (2006) also report an increasing 
correlation of the business cycles of the three 
largest euro-area countries from the mid-1990s.6 
                                                     
3  See Focus on 'Growth differences in the euro area', 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2005), 
and Focus on ‘Cyclical convergence in the euro area’, 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2004). 
4  Giannone, D. and L. Reichlin (2006), 'Trends and cycles 
in the euro area: how much heterogeneity and should we 
worry about it? ', ECB Working Paper Series, No. 595.  
5  Darvas, Z. and G. Szapáry (2005), 'Business cycle 
synchronisation in the enlarged EU', CEPR Discussion 
Paper, No. 5179. 
6  De Brandt, O., C. Bruneau and A. Flageollet (2006), 
'Assessing aggregate comovements in France, Germany 
and Italy using a non stationary factor model of the euro 
area', Banque de France, NER, No. 145. 
On the other hand, Artis (2005) does not find 
clear signs of cyclical convergence among euro-
area countries and Camacho, Pérez-Quirós and 
Sainz (2005) report a decrease in business cycle 
correlations in the last decade. 7 8
The fact that the recent empirical literature is not 
fully conclusive regarding the evolution of 
business cycle synchronisation within the euro 
area in recent years suggests that synchronisation 
indicators should be regularly reviewed.  
The academic literature proposes a wide range of 
statistical tools, both to separate cyclical 
fluctuations from trend growth and to measure 
the degree of cyclical synchronisation between 
two countries. In this section, a modified version 
of the Hodrick and Prescott filter was used to 
extract the cyclical component from national real 
GDP series. Synchronisation is measured via two 
simple statistical tools: the dispersion of national 
output gaps and their correlation (see Box 4). As 
will be discussed, both tools have their pros and 
cons and can sometimes send conflicting signals.  
Indicators of cyclical dispersion point to high 
synchronisation within the euro area… 
The dispersion (or more technically the standard 
deviation) of output gaps is probably the most 
relevant measure of cyclical synchronisation in a 
macroeconomic policy perspective. At a given 
point in time, the dispersion will be close to zero 
if all Member States are in a similar cyclical 
position. Hence, the closer to zero the measure 
is, the more synchronised are the business cycles 
and the more appropriate common monetary 
impulses are for each Member State. 
Graph 13 presents the dispersion of output gaps 
for the euro-area countries. It shows that, since 
the early nineties, dispersion has narrowed 
considerably and now stands at a historical low. 
7  Artis, M. (2005), 'Business Cycle Affiliations and their 
determinants: where do we stand?', European Economy, 
Economic Papers, No. 227.  
8  Camacho, M., G. Pérez-Quirós and L. Sainz (2005), 'Are 
European business cycles close enough to be just one?'; 
European Economy, Economic Papers, No. 227. It is 
worth stressing, however, that in contrast to the other 
studies mentioned above, this work is based on monthly 
industrial production data instead of GDP data. 
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not clear to what extent lower volatility can be 
ascribed to temporary factors (smaller economic 
disturbances) or is an ingrained feature of OECD 
economies.  
Graph 13: Standard deviation of output gaps, euro-area 
Member States (As % of GDP – 1990Q1-2005Q4) (1) 
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Overall, it is likely that the fall in output gap 
dispersion within the euro area since the 1990s is 
attributable, at least partly, to the reduced 
amplitude of business cycles. If lower cyclical 
volatility is only temporary, the high degree of 
cyclical synchronisation currently indicated by 
measures of output gap dispersion could turn out 
to be short-lived. It is therefore necessary to 
complement the analysis by looking at additional 
indicators of cyclical synchronisation. 
(1)IE, LU and PT are excluded owing to lack of data. 
… but measures of cyclical correlation send 
more conflicting signals  
(2) Using GDP as a weight   
Source: Commission services. 
However, it cannot be excluded that the 
observed reduction in the dispersion of output 
gaps is not due to the fact that Member States' 
business cycles are increasingly in phase but is 
explained by a general decrease in the amplitude 
of cyclical fluctuations. Indeed, the dispersion 
will remain low even when national business 
cycles move apart, as long as output gaps do not 
stray too far from zero. In other words, a cyclical 
divergence trend could be masked by the low 
amplitude of cyclical fluctuations.  
The correlation of business cycles is an 
alternative measure of synchronisation that is 
insensitive to changes in the amplitude of the 
business cycle. Graph 14 displays the mean of 
the correlations of euro-area Member States' 
business cycles with the euro-area cycle (as 
measured by detrended euro-area GDP). The 
correlations are calculated for a 6-year rolling 
window – i.e. the number at a given point in time 
is the correlation calculated for the 6 years to that 
point. A rise in the mean correlation indicates 
increased synchronisation. 
There has actually been a significant decline in 
the amplitude of business cycle fluctuations in 
most OECD countries since the 1980s. This 
reduction in cyclical volatility is well documented 
but not yet fully understood. Explanations 
proposed in the empirical literature include 
improved macroeconomic policies, structural 
reforms, changes in economic structures 
(including more developed financial markets) and 
smaller or less frequent economic shocks.9 There 
is, however, little consensus as to the relative 
importance of these factors. In particular, it is 
Graph 14: Mean output gap correlation for a 6-year 
rolling window, euro-area Member States  
(Average of the unweighted correlations between national 
and the euro-area output gaps in % – 1987Q1-2005Q4) (1) 
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9  See, for instance, Cotis, J.P. and J. Coppel (2005), 
'Business cycle dynamics in OECD countries: evidence, 
causes and policy implications', paper presented at the 
Reserve Bank of Australia Economic Conference on 'The 
changing nature of the business cycle', Sydney, Australia, 
July 11-12, 2005. Another reference is Stock, J. H. and M. 
W. Watson (2003), 'Has the Business Cycle Changed? 
Evidence and Explanations', Paper prepared for the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City symposium on 
'Monetary Policy and Uncertainty', Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming, August 28–30, 2003. 
(1) AT, IE, LU and PT are excluded owing to lack of data. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Box 4: Measuring business cycle convergence 
 
Various methods have been proposed in the literature to investigate the issue of business cycle convergence. One 
possible approach is to look at the evolution of the standard deviation of euro-area countries' business cycles over 
time. The smaller the standard deviation for a given period, the closer the individual cycles cluster together. It is 
important to bear in mind that the measure is scale-dependent, i.e. for a given level of cyclical synchronisation, the 
standard deviation will rise (or fall) proportionally with a rise (or fall) of the mean amplitude of the individual cycles. 
Given that the absolute degree of dispersion of euro-area output gaps is of great importance for the conduct of 
monetary policy in a monetary union, the standard deviation is a very relevant measure to gauge the degree of cyclical 
convergence in the euro area.  
 
Due to its scale-dependency, however, it is less suited to measuring the genuine synchronisation dimension of 
business cycle convergence, i.e. whether the cycles display a common periodicity and phase, disregarding possible 
changes in amplitude. By contrast, the coefficient of correlation between the business cycles of euro-area countries 
lends itself well to an examination of this issue. Such correlation coefficients can be computed over a series of rolling 
windows, providing a continuous track of developments over time. This approach is taken in numerous 
investigations of the issue of business cycle synchronisation, in the euro area and elsewhere. Belo (2001) 
demonstrates that the correlation approach allows an accurate assessment of business cycle synchronisation within 
the euro area. It enables conclusions to be drawn that are consistent with an analysis of the concordance index 
proposed by Harding and Pagan (2002) (the concordance index measures the fraction of time that the cycles of two 
countries are in the same phase). However, the correlation measure also suffers from drawbacks. Indeed, correlations 
can be very sensitive to the length of the rolling window chosen. Moreover, small shifts in cycles could lead to 
systematic drops in correlation at turning points of the cycles if the window is shorter than the length of the cycle.  
References: 
Belo, F. (2001), ‘Some Facts about the Cyclical Convergence in the Euro Zone’, Economic Bulletin, Banco de Portugal, 
December. 
Harding, D. and A. Pagan (2002), ‘Synchronization of Cycles’, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 
mimeo. 
Based on this measure, cyclical synchronisation 
within the euro area showed a clear upward trend 
between the late 1980s and the late 1990s. 
Contrary to dispersion indicators, the correlation 
measure points to a sharp but short-lived drop in 
synchronisation in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
A look at the individual Member States' 
contribution to the drop suggests that the 
temporary desynchronisation mainly reflected the 
differentiated effect of the emerging-market crisis 
of the late 1990s combined with the beginning of 
a phase of divergence between Greece and the 
rest of the euro area. Thanks to robust domestic 
demand, Member States such as the Netherlands 
and Spain weathered the emerging-market crisis 
with only a mild slowdown in economic growth. 
Other countries such as Finland and Italy were 
hit more severely. However, since 2000, a clear 
convergence trend has again been visible.  
A major drawback of measures of cyclical 
synchronisation based on correlation is that they 
are sensitive to the length of the period chosen. 
The mean euro-area correlation computed over a 
6-year window gives more or less the same 
picture as the 8-year window (which is also used 
in the empirical literature). However, if we look 
at the mean correlation computed over a shorter 
4-year window, the picture changes considerably 
(Graph 15). It becomes difficult to discern any 
convergence trend in the 1990s. Furthermore, 
the estimated average correlation displays large 
and regular swings: 
¾ There was a temporary divergence phase in 
the early 1990s which is mostly attributable to 
a number of asymmetric shocks which hit the 
euro area in those years, including German 
unification, the effect of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union on the Finnish economy and a 
public sector crisis in Greece. In the longer 6-
year window, these asymmetric shocks only 
translated into a pause in the upward trend in 
correlation.  
¾ The episode of divergence of the late 1990s 
already noted in the case of the 6-year 
window is also visible with the 4-year 
window. Interestingly, it begins somewhat 
earlier than in the case of the longer window. 
The countries responsible for the fall are the 
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same for both windows, suggesting that the 
shorter window may have some leading 
properties. 
¾ Euro-area business cycles seem to have again 
entered a phase of lower synchronisation 
since the second half of 2004. The fall in 
correlation is mainly attributable to Belgium, 
Finland, Greece and Spain. 
Graph 15: Mean output gap correlation for a 4-year 
rolling window, euro-area Member States  
(Average of the unweighted correlations between national 
and the euro-area output gaps in % – 1987Q1-2005Q4) (1) 
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(1) AT, IE, LU and PT are excluded owing to lack of data. 
Source: Commission services. 
Overall, any assessment of cyclical 
synchronisation based on correlation should be 
interpreted with caution. Indeed, this indicator 
can be very sensitive to the length of the period 
for which it is calculated. Shorter windows tend 
to be more sensitive to small deviations in 
Member States’ business cycles and may 
therefore sometimes suggest large falls in 
synchronisation even when the underlying 
divergence is minor and short-lived.10 The 
comparison between the 4- and 6-year windows 
suggests that the shorter window may sometimes 
have leading properties over the longer one. The 
sources of the recent drop in correlation reported 
in Graph 15 therefore need to be investigated 
carefully.  
                                                     
10  Simulations show that the correlation between two 
identical series, one of which is slightly lagged, displays a 
pattern of periodical drops, when the correlation window 
is smaller than the length of the cycles. The risk of such 
systematic drops is thus higher for the 4-year window 
than for the 6-year window.   
Several factors explain the recent fall in some 
correlation measures  
Several divergence factors emerge from the 
analysis of the business cycles of the Member 
States which have contributed to the fall in 
correlation observed since 2004 with the 4-year 
window. 
A slight shift in the Belgian cycle. The fall in 
correlation between the Belgian and the euro-
area cycles since 2004 reflects a slight shift in 
cycles. The Belgian cycle, which had traditionally 
been closely aligned with the euro-area cycle, 
seems to have lagged the rest of the euro area 
since 2003 (Graph 16). The lag, however, has 
remained small (about a quarter), illustrating the 
fact that correlation coefficients can be very 
sensitive to small shifts in cycles, specially when 
they are calculated for short windows.  
Graph 16: The euro-area and Belgian business cycles 
(Output gap in % – 1990Q1-2005Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Specific factors in Greece. Since the mid-1990s, 
Greece has tended to be the odd country out, 
with a business cycle largely disconnected from 
the rest of the euro area (Graph 17). This low 
synchronisation can partly be explained by 
structural features of the Greek economy, 
particularly its comparatively low integration in 
intra-area trade. In recent years, the Greek 
economy has benefited from the positive impact 
of a later adoption of the euro and the strong 
economic stimulus from the 2004 Olympic 
Games.  
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Graph 17: The euro-area and Greek business cycles 
(Output gap in % – 1990Q1-2005Q4) 
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Source: Commission services.  
Common shocks with differentiated effects. Differences 
in Member States’ economic structures may lead 
to possible temporary episodes of cyclical 
divergence. Fluctuation in world trade may have 
such an asymmetric effect. Graph 18 suggests 
that, since 2004, the Finnish economy has been 
much more exposed to the swings of the world 
trade cycle than the rest of the euro area. Finnish 
exports have also responded to these swings with 
a slight lag that can probably be ascribed to the 
country's highly specialised production structure. 
Given Finland's trade openness the slight lag in 
exports has entailed a slight lag in the business 
cycle that, as in the case of Belgium, has brought 
a large fall in the correlation with the euro-area 
business cycle.  
Graph 18: The world trade and the Finnish and euro-
area business cycles (Output gap in % – 1995Q1-2005Q4 
and world trade: y-o-y % change) 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1995Q1 1997Q1 1999Q1 2001Q1 2003Q1 2005Q1
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0World trade
Finland (rhs)
Euro area (rhs)
 
Source: Commission services. 
The real interest rate channel at work in Spain. Cyclical 
activity in Spain picked up gradually during the 
course of 2004 and did not experience the 
relapse observed in the rest of the euro area. 
Growth in 2004 was 3.1%, in contrast with the 
euro-area's 2%. In 2005, Spain remained amongst 
the fastest-growing economies in the euro area. 
As a consequence, the decoupling with the euro-
area cycles over the past two years appears 
somewhat more marked for Spain than for 
Belgium or Finland (Graph 19).  
Graph 19: The euro area and Spanish business cycles 
(Output gap in % – 1990Q1-2005Q4) 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
1990Q1 1992Q1 1994Q1 1996Q1 1998Q1 2000Q1 2002Q1 2004Q1
EA
ES
 
Source: Commission services. 
The recent fall in Spain's synchronisation is 
rooted in domestic demand. Economic activity in 
Spain has been led by domestic demand with 
private consumption being supported by strong 
job creation and the effect of real interest rates in 
EMU. Under a single monetary policy, countries 
with higher inflation enjoy comparatively lower 
real interest rates that tend to fuel domestic 
demand. In the case of Spain, the divergence 
effect of real interest rates seems to have been 
reinforced by the interaction between real 
interest rates and housing markets. Given that 
inflation differentials tend to persist over 
relatively long periods, the real interest rate 
channel emerges as a potentially lasting source of 
cyclical differences in Spain, albeit an increased 
sensitivity to short-term interest rates may lead to 
a stronger impact of the ongoing monetary 
tightening by the ECB. The Spanish economy is 
therefore experiencing a phase of 
desynchronisation with the rest of the euro area 
that, although moderate at this stage, could turn 
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out to be less short-lived than in the case of 
Greece, Finland and Belgium.  
Finally, it is worth stressing that, apart from the 
case of Spain, the recent cyclical 
desynchronisation is entirely attributable to 
smaller Member States. In contrast, the business 
cycles of France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands have remained closely aligned 
(Graph 20). In 2005, the average cyclical 
correlation of these countries with the euro area 
stood above 90%.  
Overall, the recent drop in the average 4-year 
correlation does not seem to give much cause for 
concern, except possibly in the case of Spain. 
Some degree of cyclical differences is 
unavoidable in an economic and monetary union 
which is subject to country-specific factors or 
common shocks with asymmetric impacts. 
Furthermore, measures of correlation can 
sometimes be very sensitive to what may be 
considered as minor deviations in business cycles 
and should therefore be interpreted with 
prudence.  
Conclusion 
Although measures of cyclical synchronisation 
have recently sent somewhat conflicting signals, 
the analysis presented here suggests that Member 
States’ business cycles have remained relatively 
closely aligned in the past few years.  Graph 20: Business cycles of the euro area, France, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands 
While the dispersion of Member States' output 
gaps has remained at historical lows, some 
measures of business cycle correlation have 
pointed to a possible cyclical desynchronisation 
in a few Member States (Belgium, Greece, 
Finland and Spain) since 2004. A careful analysis 
of these countries shows that these signs of 
desynchronisation are not generally a source of 
concern. They mostly reflect temporary and 
minor shifts in cycles which are inevitable in 
EMU insofar as economic structures still vary 
significantly across Member States. Nevertheless 
they should continue to deserve attention by 
national policy makers.  
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Source: Commission services. 
 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 25 -  
Focus 
II. The growing importance of services in the euro-area economy 
Over the last three decades, the euro area, like other developed economies, has undergone a progressive shift of its production 
structure from goods to services which now account for about 70% of employment and GDP. The objective of this focus is to 
review the specificities of services compared with manufacturing and discuss the impact of the shift on the euro-area economy.  
Services tend to be relatively sheltered from external trade or cyclical fluctuations. The services sector is prone to higher and 
more persistent inflation than industry. Finally, it is also the mainstay of employment creation but, unlike in the USA, 
suffers from low and decelerating productivity gains. The shift to services therefore has potentially important implications for 
the performance of the euro-area economy in terms of productivity, inflation and business cycle fluctuations.  
Nevertheless, the analysis presented in this focus shows that these enduring features of services should be refined in two ways. 
First, the services sector is characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity. Some sub-sectors, particularly in the market services 
sector, are relatively exposed to international trade and can be subject to strong cyclical swings either directly or because of 
strong input-output linkages with industry. Second, low productivity and high and persistent inflation are partly a symptom of 
a lack of competition and therefore not an inevitable structural feature of the sector. The US experience shows that the shift to 
services does not necessarily entail a deceleration of productivity. There is room for dynamic services markets that contribute 
both to employment and to strong productivity growth provided that an adequate framework is set in place that fosters 
competition and allows service providers to innovate, restructure and make full use of the possibilities offered by ICT.
The objective of this focus section is to review 
the contribution of the services sector to the 
euro-area economy and to highlight the 
specificity of service sectors relative to industry. 
After assessing the rising weight of services in 
the economy (Section 1), the note examines the 
contribution of services to productivity and 
inflation (Sections 2 and 3). It then gauges the 
strength of the sector’s linkages with the 
international economy (Section 4) and domestic 
industry (Section 5). A final section discusses 
briefly the exposure of services to business cycle 
fluctuations (Section 6).  
1.  The growing importance of services in 
the euro-area economy  
Services account for about 70% of total value 
added and total employment in the euro area. 
The last three decades have witnessed a steady 
rise in their importance in the euro-area 
economy. The share of services in the economy's 
total value added increased by more than 
13 percentage points between 1980 and 2003. 
(Table 4) The gain was even more impressive 
when measured in terms of employment (17 pp).  
The structural shift towards services has been 
widespread among developed economies. Within 
the euro area, the shift has been associated with a 
marked convergence process. As shown in 
Graph 21, countries where services were less 
developed in the mid-1980s have experienced 
larger increases in the share of services over the 
last two decades. There has also been a steady 
convergence of the euro-area share of services 
towards the higher US level.  
Graph 21: Convergence in the share of services in total 
employment, euro-area Member States (In %) 
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Source: OECD STAN database, Commission services. 
Looking at the composition of services, much of 
the increase stems from the expansion of the 
subcomponent 'finance, real estate and business 
services', which accounts for about 28% of the 
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value added in services in the euro area (but only 
15% of employment). Limited data is available 
on the composition of this sector but available 
evidence in some Member States suggests that 
growth in activity and employment may be 
mainly ascribed to real estate activities, computer 
services and other business activities. By contrast, 
financial services seem to have played only a 
negligible role in the relative expansion of 
services in the euro area. Finally, reflecting weak 
gains in productivity or problems related to the 
measurement of prices, some sectors – such as 
community and personal services – have made 
significant contributions to employment growth 
but more modest contributions to growth in 
value added.  
Several factors are likely to have contributed to 
the structural shift towards services.  
First, households tend to spend more on some 
categories of services as their income grows. The 
fact that the weight of services in the economy 
tends to be higher in countries with higher GDP 
per capita lends support to this explanation.  
Second, demand for services is being driven up 
by a number of technological, regulatory and 
socioeconomic factors. In sectors such as 
transport and high-tech services (telecom and 
computer services) it is rapid technical 
developments, sometimes combined with 
deregulation, that are fuelling demand. In the 
corporate sector, the tendency to outsource non-
core activities means that some service activities 
previously performed internally by 
manufacturing companies are now performed by 
service companies and recorded as services in 
national accounts (e.g. cleaning services, 
computer services). Rising female employment 
may also result in the transfer to the market of 
activities previously carried out by households on 
their own account (e.g. child care). Population 
ageing is also fuelling demand for care and health 
services.  
2. A prominent role in employment and 
productivity developments  
The contribution of services to employment  
The services sector has long been the mainstay of 
employment creation in the euro area. In the 
eighties, job creation in services more than offset 
job losses in manufacturing and the acceleration 
of employment growth since the mid-1990s owes 
much to the dynamic development of market 
services (Table 5).11 The contribution of non-
market services, while still substantial, has not 
played a major role in the recent improvement of 
employment figures. 
Table 4: Trends in the share of services in total employment and value added, euro area 
(Share of total in % – 1980-2003) 
 Value added Employment (2) 
 1980 1990 2003 1980 1990 2003 
Total services  58.5 63.9 71.0 51.8 59.9 68.0 
   Market services  37.0 41.9 47.1 30.6 34.7 39.9 
   of which:        
         Trade and tourism 12.0 12.4 12.5 16.9 18.3 19.3 
         Transport and communication 7.1 6.7 6.8 6.3 6.2 6.0 
         Financial and business services 17.3 22.8 27.8 7.4 10.3 14.7 
   Non-market services 21.6 22.0 23.9 21.2 25.2 28.1 
Manufacturing 26.6 23.4 18.4 26.5 23.2 18.5 
Other good sectors (1) 14.9 12.7 10.6 21.8 16.9 13.5 
All  sectors 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(1) Agriculture, mining, construction and supply of electricity gas and water. 
(2) In man-hours. 
Source: Commission services and Groningen Growth and Development Centre. 
 
11  In this focus section, services are broken down into 
market and non-market services. ‘Market services’ 
include wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles, and other household goods; hotels 
and restaurants; transport, storage and communication; 
financial intermediation; and real estate, renting and 
business activities. ‘Non-market services’ include public 
administration and defence, compulsory social security; 
education; health and social work; other community, 
social and personal service activities; and employment in 
private households. It should be stressed that the 
distinction between market and non-market services is a 
somewhat arbitrary simplification as some services 
included in the 'market services' sector also partly belong 
to the public sphere (e.g. research and development 
activities) and vice versa.  
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Table 5: Employment growth, euro area (1) 
 Contribution to average annual growth (In %) 
 1980-90 1990-97 1997-03 
Total economy 0.7 0.1 1.3 
Of which:    
Manufacturing -0.2 -0.5 0.0
Market services 0.6 0.4 0.9
Non-market serv. 0.5 0.4 0.5
(1) Based on number of jobs. 
Source: Commission services and Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre. 
Within market services, business services are 
especially dynamic as they account for half of the 
sector’s contribution to total employment growth 
in the 1997-2002 period. Their rapid expansion 
reflects not only buoyant demand but also, as 
already mentioned, increasing outsourcing in the 
manufacturing sector. In the latter case, 
employment growth in services finds its statistical 
counterpart in job losses in manufacturing.  
Graph 22: Value added per employee in business 
service sectors, euro area (1) (1000 euro, 2003) 
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Source: Commission services. 
However, business services are by no means a 
homogenous entity. Within the sector, two sub-
groups can be identified. The first – comprising 
the cleaning, security and temporary-work 
sectors – is characterised by low value-added per 
employee (Graph 22), a weak investment rate 
and high numbers of personnel per company. It 
accounted for 36% of employment and 19% of 
value added in business services in 2003. The 
other, made up of computer services, 
consultancy work and advertising, constitutes 
52% of employment and 69% of value-added. 
Both sub-groups have witnessed a rapid rise in 
employment (respectively + 30% and + 35% 
from 1998 to 2003). 
Productivity gains tend to be slow in services 
and have stalled in recent years… 
Labour productivity tends to be lower in services 
than in manufacturing due to factors related to 
the sector's production process, including the 
need for face-to-face relations between providers 
and consumers of most services, and less scope 
for technological change. In addition, some 
services cannot be stockpiled; they have to be 
produced and delivered at the same time. Finally, 
service companies tend to be smaller than 
manufacturing companies. This reduces the 
scope for mass production, scale economies and 
exploitation of international comparative 
advantage.  
Lack of competition is another explanation for 
weak productivity gains in services. Services are 
much less exposed to international trade and 
foreign competition than goods and many sub-
sectors are still subject to a constraining 
regulatory environment. Restrictions on 
competition tend to ease the pressures to 
innovate and make it harder to put in place more 
effective production processes.  
A recent empirical study by the ECB confirms 
this relation by providing evidence of a negative 
link between restrictions on competition and 
productivity.12 The study provides econometric 
estimates of the impact of regulations (using 
various measures thereof) on labour productivity 
in services. The estimations are based on a panel 
of euro-area Member States' data and carried out 
for the aggregate services sector as well as several 
individual sub-sectors. The results show that, 
once key macroeconomic determinants are taken 
into account (e.g. R&D spending, GDP per 
capita), a higher level of sectoral regulation has a 
negative impact on growth in labour productivity 
in the aggregate services sector. The study also 
reports that employment protection legislation 
has a negative effect on productivity. 
Nevertheless, reflecting the heterogeneity of 
                                                     
12  ECB (2006), Competition, productivity and prices in the 
euro area service sector’, ECB Occasional Paper, No. 44, 
April. 
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services and possible measurement problems in 
some sub-sectors, regression results vary 
significantly depending on the services sub-
sectors considered. In particular, for 'hotels and 
restaurants' and 'real estate, renting and business 
services', measures of regulations either do not 
seem to have a meaningful effect or come with 
the  wrong sign.  
Productivity growth in services has decelerated 
significantly in the euro area since the 1990s. 
This deceleration seems to be of a structural 
rather than a cyclical nature, although not all 
service sectors have been equally hit (Graph 23). 
A possible explanation – which holds for both 
services and industry – is that wage moderation 
and the labour market reforms undertaken in the 
euro area since the 1980s have contributed to a 
reduction in capital-labour substitution. In 
addition, the re-integration of lower-productivity 
workers into the workforce may have exerted 
downward pressure on productivity by weighing 
on total factor productivity. According to this 
explanation, much of the deceleration of 
productivity should prove to be temporary. 
Nevertheless, empirical work carried out for the 
whole economy suggests that labour market 
reforms and wage moderation can only account 
for part of the trend deceleration in productivity 
growth in the euro area.13
Other possible explanations for the slowdown in 
productivity include the outsourcing trend from 
manufacturing to services and low competition in 
the service sector. However, neither explanation 
stands up to closer scrutiny. It is true that an 
acceleration of the scope of outsourcing of 
lower-productivity activities from manufacturing 
to the service sector could potentially have a 
negative impact on labour productivity in 
services, but if this were the explanation we 
should find its counterpart in an acceleration of 
manufacturing productivity, and we do not. As to 
competition, whereas the persistently low level of 
growth in productivity in the services sectors can 
partly be ascribed to a low level of competition, 
its deceleration since the mid-1990s is difficult to 
relate to competition which, if anything, has 
13  See European Economy 2004 Review, Chapter 3. 
According to estimates provided in this study, labour 
market reforms account for 10% to 35% of the 
deceleration in the growth of total factor productivity for 
the euro-area economy as a whole.  
increased slightly in services in recent years. 
Overall, therefore, the trend decline in 
productivity remains partly unexplained. 
Graph 23: Trend hourly labour productivity, euro area  
(Average annual growth in % – 1990-2003) (1) 
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Sources: Commission services and Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre. 
…while the gap with the USA has widened 
These lacklustre developments stand in sharp 
contrast with the acceleration of US productivity 
in services from the mid-nineties on. There is 
evidence linking this acceleration to the impact 
of information and communication technologies 
(ICT), whether directly through productivity 
gains associated with the production of ICT 
services, or indirectly through additional 
productivity gains as a result of their diffusion. 
This productivity surge has widened the gap with 
the euro area. As shown in Table 6, even if the 
euro area is keeping pace with the USA in ICT-
producing sectors, strong productivity gains in 
US ICT-using sectors are not matched by similar 
gains in Europe.  
Nevertheless, productivity comparisons between 
the euro area and the USA should be considered 
with prudence. Much of the divergence stems 
from a few ICT-using services such as trade and 
financial services (Graph 24) and further 
disaggregated analysis of the gap with the USA is 
needed for two main reasons. First, it cannot be 
excluded that factors other than ICT explain the 
widening gap with the euro area. For instance, 
productivity acceleration in the US wholesale and 
retail sectors has been associated with the 
emergence of the ‘big box’ business model. Such 
an evolution might be more difficult to achieve 
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in the euro area due to stricter zoning 
restrictions, shop-opening regulations and 
competition barriers. The fact that the US 
economy has also experienced a pick-up in 
productivity growth in the service sectors which 
do not make an intensive use of ICT (Table 6) 
lends some support to the idea that factors other 
than ICT have also contributed to the gap 
between the euro area and the USA. Second, 
productivity is notoriously difficult to measure in 
these sectors and the gap might partly be a 
statistical artefact.14
Table 6: Hourly labour productivity, euro area 
and USA (Average annual growth in %) 
 Euro area USA 
 1989-1996 
1997-
2003 
1989-
1996 
1997-
2003 
Total 2.1 1.5 1.2 2.4 
Manufacturing 3.4 3.1 3.7 5.5 
Services 1.6 1.0 1.4 3.1 
of which:      
ICT producing 
services 3.8 5.4 3.3 5.2 
ICT using services 1.5 1.5 2.0 4.9 
Other services  1.5 0.1 0.5 1.1 
Sources: Commission services and Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre. 
 
Graph 24: Hourly productivity, selected fast growing 
service sectors (Average annual growth in % – 1997-2003) 
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Source: Commission services and Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre. 
                                                     
14  The European Commission is funding further research 
efforts in this area with the EUKLEMS project. In this 
context, more detailed and internationally comparable 
industrial productivity data should be made available by 
the end of 2006. 
3.  High and persistent inflation in 
services  
Since January 1991, services inflation – weighting 
41% in the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices – has generally been, at an average of 
3.1%, than headline inflation at 2.3% (Graph 25).  
Among the main services components, hospital 
services, medical and paramedical services, health 
insurance, financial services and transport 
services have had the highest inflation rates since 
January 1999. This suggests that high inflation in 
services may, to some extent, be attributed to 
temporary factors. Rapid price increases in 
health-care services have partly to do with 
reforms, such as the phasing-out of 
reimbursement of certain health-care services in 
Germany and the reduction in health-care 
coverage in the Netherlands in January 2004. 
Further, strong increases in petrol prices in 2000-
2001 and 2005-2006 have fuelled inflation in the 
transportation sector.  
Graph 25: Services, non-energy industrial goods and 
headline HICP inflation, euro area 
(Y-o-y % changes – Jan 1991 to March 2006) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Services
Headline HICP 
Non-energy industrial goods 
 
Source: Commission services. 
Nevertheless, the enduring nature of the inflation 
differential between services and industry 
indicates that temporary factors such as structural 
reforms or high oil prices have only a limited 
explanatory power. To assess the sources of the 
differential, Table 7 displays inflation in industrial 
goods and services as measured by the deflators 
of value added in national accounts. The change 
is decomposed into productivity, wage and profit 
margin components. The table clearly shows that 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2006 
 
- 30 - 
 
 Table 7: Inflation as measured by value added deflators, euro area 
(Average y-o-y changes in %) (1) 
 1992Q1-1998Q4 1999Q1-2005Q4 
 p w q ulc π p w q ulc π 
Industry 0.9 3.4 3.2 0.2 0.6 0.3 2.3 2.5 -0.2 0.5 
Services 2.0 2.5 0.9 1.6 0.4 2.1 2.1 0.2 2.0 0.1 
 of which:           
Market services 1.8 2.4 1.1 1.3 0.6 2.0 1.9 0.2 1.8 0.2 
Non-market services 2.3 2.6 0.4 2.2 0.2 2.4 2.3 -0.2 2.5 -0.1 
Total economy 1.7 2.7 1.6 1.1 0.6 1.8 2.1 0.7 1.4 0.3 
(1) Based on data for BE, DE, ES, FR, IT, AT and FI. p = value added deflator, w = compensation per employee, q = productivity (value 
added in constant prices divided by total employment), ulc = unit labour costs and π = profit margin.  
Source: Commission services. 
productivity differentials are the main cause of 
the persistent inflation gap between services and 
industry. Between 1999 and 2005, productivity 
growth averaged 2.3% in industry and 0.2% in 
the services sector. A similar productivity 
differential was registered during the 1990s. As 
already discussed, the productivity gap reflects 
important differences in the production 
processes of manufacturing and services but also 
differences in the degree of competition.  
Developments in wage growth can differ 
substantially between services and industry over 
short periods of time. However, these differences 
tend to narrow over time. Hence, since 1999, 
wage differentials between the two sectors have 
accounted for only a relatively small part of 
average inflation differentials. Wage growth has 
remained slower in services than in industry but 
the gap between the two sectors has been much 
smaller than productivity differentials. This 
suggests a certain degree of inter-sectoral labour 
market integration in euro-area countries. The 
wage differential even narrowed in the 1990s, 
which may be an indication that labour market 
integration has somewhat improved.  
Besides its comparatively high level, inflation in 
services is also characterised by a high degree of 
persistence in the euro area. After a shock, 
service prices need more time than industrial 
goods prices to return to their long-term level.  
The higher persistence of service inflation is 
illustrated in Table 8, which provides sectoral 
estimates of price-setting equations. Results 
should be considered with prudence given the 
short sample over which the equations were 
estimated, but they point to a much slower 
response of prices to changes in the business 
cycle for services than for industry. In the case of 
market services, the response of prices to 
changes in unit labour cost appears quite sluggish 
(the estimated coefficient is actually not 
significant at the 10% level). 
 
Table 8: Estimations of sectoral price-setting 
equations, euro area (1) 
(Dependent variable: inflation in the value-added 
deflator) 
 Industry Market 
services 
Non-
market 
services
Constant 0.77 (1.7) 1.68 (5.7) 1.69 (4.5)
ULC (lagged 1 q) 0.25 (3.1) 0.14 (1.3) –– 
ULC (lagged 3 q) –– –– 0.20 (1.7)
Out. gap (lagged 1 q) 0.40 (3.1) –– –– 
Out. gap (lagged 4 q) –– 0.86 (3.7) –– 
Dummy 1996:1 –– –– 1.31 (2.2)
AR (1) 0.77 (8.3) 0.71 (6.3) 0.63 (5.2)
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.75 0.47 
(1) Based on data for BE, DE, ES, FR, IT, AT, and FI. Inflation 
and unit labour costs are measured in y-o-y % changes. Sample is 
1992Q1–2005Q4. Output gap is calculated as % of potential 
output. Potential output is calculated with the HP-filter (λ=1600). 
t-statistic within parenthesis. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
These findings are in line with a number of 
recent empirical studies which report higher 
inflation persistence and price stickiness in 
service sectors than in the rest of the economy. 
For instance, Altissimo et al. (2006) conclude that 
services in the euro area exhibit a larger degree of 
nominal price rigidity than goods (i.e. price 
changes are less frequent for services than for 
goods). Furthermore, price cuts are less common 
in services than in other sectors. Likely 
explanations for the higher price stickiness in 
services include wage rigidities – wages form a 
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larger share of production costs in the case of 
services than in the case of goods – and 
insufficient competition.15  
4.  Services and international trade 
A low exposure to international trade  
Services are traditionally portrayed as having a 
small bearing on international trade. Input-
output tables computed for seven euro-area 
countries reveal that exports in most sub-sectors 
account for less than 2% of total output, with 
financial services and telecommunications only 
marginally above that level. On average, service 
sectors exported less than 6% of their output in 
2000 (the last year for which input-output data 
are available), compared to an export share of 
close to 40% for the manufacturing industry.  
Graph 26: Exports as a share of production, selected 
services, euro area (In % – 2000) (1) 
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(1) Based on data from seven countnes. 
Source: Commission services. 
A minority of service sectors, however, export a 
much bigger share of their output. In addition to 
transport and wholesale trade, which are more 
open due to their structural characteristics, 
services to companies, including R&D and 
computer services also export a non-negligible 
share of their output (Graph 26). Taken together 
these more-export-intensive service sectors 
                                                     
15  See Altissimo, F., M. Ehrmann and F. Smets (2006), 
‘Inflation persistence and price setting in the euro area. A 
summary of the IPN evidence’, ECB Occasional Paper, 
No. 46. 
account for close to one third of total output in 
the service sector of the euro area.  
Expansion of trade in services is parallel to 
trade in goods 
In unconsolidated terms (i.e. including intra-area 
trade) the euro area accounted for 33% of total 
world trade in services in 2005. In recent years, 
the volume of exports of services expanded at a 
rapid pace, their share in GDP rising from 8% in 
1995 to 12% in 2005 (like balance of payments 
data, national accounts do not disentangle intra-
area flows from extra-area flows). In growth 
terms, trade in services has merely expanded at 
the same pace as trade in goods, a rather 
lacklustre performance given that it is starting 
from a much lower level. 
Over the last decade, fluctuations in euro-area 
exports of services have been closely correlated 
with fluctuations in exports of goods (Graph 27). 
Beyond the fact that trade is driven by common 
macroeconomic factors in both sectors, an 
explanation for these co-movements might be 
that the provision of services is often bundled 
with deliveries of goods.  
Graph 27: Exports of goods and services, euro area 
(Volume, y-o-y change – 1996Q1-2005Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Balance-of-payment data indicate that, a small 
surplus has emerged in the service sector in 
recent years, reaching EUR 21 billon in 2005 
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(0.2 % of GDP) (Graph 28).16 An analysis of the 
sub-components of the BoP data reveals the 
following points (Table 9):  
¾ Travel, construction services and computer 
services are major contributors to the euro-
area surplus.  
¾ Sectors which have registered rapid export 
growth in recent years include computer 
services and miscellaneous business services 
such as legal, management and consultancy.  
¾ It should also be noted that the large surplus 
registered in the computer services sector is 
associated with a large deficit in royalties. The 
surplus and deficit are both mostly 
attributable to Ireland, reflecting the 
prominent role of non-European 
multinational companies in that country.  
¾ Finally, the development of internationally 
tradable high-value-added business service 
has some way to go: a deficit in fees related to 
the provision of technical know-how – 
through consultancy arrangements for 
instance – is recorded, in contrast to the 
significant US surplus (USD 20.7 billion in 
2003). 
Graph 28: Trade in goods and services, euro area 
(12-months cumulated balance – in EUR millions, monthly 
data, 1999 – 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
16  Part of the improvement results from the integration of 
Greece into the euro area. Greece records a large surplus 
in travel and transportation services. 
Table 9: Trade in services – selected components, 
euro area 
Annual 
growth 
(00-03, 
average %)  
Net trade 
(Value in 
EUR bn, 
2003) 
Weight in 
total 
trade(1)  
(%, 2003) 
Exp Imp
Transport +4.7 20.8 4.4 3.6 
Travel +10.4 24.1 4.9 2.6 
Construction +4.6 2.8 -0.7 -1.7 
Computer  +8.7 4.3 18.9 8.3 
Royalties -13.1 5.0 7.3 6.3 
Misc. services -4.2 10.1 11.2 6.4 
Of which   
consultancy  -2.2 5.0 20.7 12.4 
(1) Exports plus imports. 
Source: Balance of Payments data. 
 
Foreign direct investment as a substitute for 
direct trade 
Notwithstanding the sector's limited direct 
exposure to foreign trade, services are not 
immune from the influence of globalisation. 
Indeed, the sector appears as exposed to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) as manufacturing. The 
share of services in the FDI outward position of 
the euro area (i.e. the total accumulated stock of 
FDI) rose from 65% in 1995 to 72% in 2003, a 
level that is comparable to the sector's weight in 
GDP. The services' stock of FDI represented 
25.4% of GDP in 2003, compared to 12.9% for 
the United States.17
Hindrances to direct trade might partly explain 
why companies use FDI to gain a foothold in 
external markets. However, product specificities 
play also a role. For instance, and even when e-
commerce developments make it possible, most 
people are reluctant to avail themselves of the 
usual range of financial services without face-to-
face contacts.  
Even if FDI may act as a substitute to foreign 
trade in services, it may also act as a catalyst, as a 
reinforced presence of affiliates in a given 
country might provide additional commercial 
opportunities for the delivery of cross-border 
                                                     
17  Based on OECD data for 8 Member States. Data include 
intra-area FDI operations. 
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services over the medium term. For instance, 
according to the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, US affiliates abroad accounted in 2004 
for 35% of exports of private services (excluding 
travel and transports) and for more than 75% of 
royalties and licence fees received domestically.  
Finally, it should be noted that fears that 
offshoring of service activities outside the euro 
area would lead to of massive job losses do not 
seem to be borne out by the available data at the 
macro level. Euro-area exports of computer 
services are well ahead of imports, while the 
deficit recorded by the euro area for 
miscellaneous services, which encompasses most 
business services liable to be offshored, has not 
widened in recent years. 
5. Strong linkages between services and 
industry  
There are strong linkages between service and 
manufacturing sectors. These linkages take two 
major forms. First, service sectors are important 
suppliers and outlets for manufacturing. Second, 
and more indirectly, the interplay between 
manufacturing and services is part of an 
economy’s adjustment to disturbances.  
Graph 29: Breakdown of total demand by type of 
demand, euro area (1) (2) (Shares in % in 2000) 
31.5
5.5
16.0
43.4
51.1
12.9
40.8
41.9
63.6
18.2
9.3
0.67.2
0.6
1.5
8.6
9.0
0.5
3.1
4.1
23.632.422.336.115.5
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Industry Market services Non-market
services
Total services All sectors
Exports Total inputs Government 
Investment Private consumption
 
(1) Based on input-output data for BE, DE, FR, IT, AT and FI. 
(2) Contribution of stocks not shown (less than 0.5% of total). 
.Source: Commission services. 
The substantial weight of intermediate 
consumption in demand for both industry and 
services (about 40% in both sectors, see 
Graph 29) allows for possible strong interactions 
between the two sectors. Input/output 
techniques can be used to assess the size of these 
linkages. Table 10 displays a breakdown of the 
sectoral destinations of production in industry 
and services once the direct as well as indirect 
linkages related to intermediate consumption are 
taken into account.18 It shows that 15% of 
services production is channelled directly or 
indirectly to goods sectors – 11% from industry 
and 4% from other goods sectors. The share is 
close to 20% in the case of market services and is 
particularly high in the case of wholesale trade, 
transport and business services – reaching 30-
40% in the case of most business services. On 
the other hand it is almost negligible for most 
non-market service sectors.  
Overall, the estimates presented in Table 10 
indicate that fluctuations in activity in industry 
can have a significant bearing on services. 
However, they also suggest that reverse linkages 
from services to goods are even stronger. 
Services account for 20% of demand in industry. 
For instance, the health service sector is an 
important outlet for pharmaceutical and medical 
equipment sectors. Service sectors, particularly 
business services, play a non-negligible role in the 
demand for office equipment while distributive 
trade sectors are intensive users of paper and 
printing products. 
Two further points are worth mentioning here. 
First, while demand impulses from industry to 
services mostly concern market services, activity 
in non-market services has a non-negligible 
driving effect on industry. Second, because the 
service sector provides significant inputs to the 
production of goods, developments in the prices 
of services could have a larger impact on external 
competitiveness than suggested by the relatively 
small share of services in total exports (25%).  
Besides input/output linkages, service sectors 
also represent an important source of investment 
demand. Services sectors account for close to 
three quarters of total investment demand in the 
euro area, most of which is directed to industry 
and construction. 
                                                     
18  The breakdown is derived from the so-called inverted 
Leontieff matrix.  
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Overall, the idea of industry as a driver of 
services rather than vice versa must be viewed 
with caution as reverse effects from activity in 
services to activity in industry may in fact be even 
more important. 
Apart from input-output relations, a more 
indirect linkage between industry and services 
relates to the fact that industrial goods are mostly 
tradable and services are, to a large extent, non-
tradable. Economic theory posits that the 
interplay between the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors is an important part of the response of an 
economy to shocks. For instance, a cyclical surge 
in domestic demand will generally be associated 
with a rise in the price of non-tradables (for 
which supply is purely domestic and therefore 
restricted) relative to the price of tradables 
(where increased imports can satisfy additional 
demand). The inflationary pressures generated by 
the surge in demand will therefore tend to be 
stronger in the non-tradable sector. Their 
strength will depend on the sensitivity of demand 
to the relative price of non-tradables as well as 
the ability of the economy to reallocate resources 
quickly and efficiently from the tradable to the 
non-tradable sector.  
Another example relates to the role of non-
tradables in external adjustment. There is 
evidence that changes in the relative prices of 
non-tradables explain a large part of observed 
fluctuations in real exchange rates in industrial 
economies.19 In addition, recent empirical 
                                                                             
19 In Burstein, T., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo (2005), 
'The importance of nontradable goods' prices in cyclical 
real exchange rate fluctuations', CEPR discussion Paper 
Series No. 5306, variations in the relative price of non-
research has highlighted the critical role of non-
tradables in the adjustment to large current 
account imbalances.20 A reduction in a large 
current account deficit requires a large cut in the 
domestic demand for imports. This can be 
achieved either by a large reduction of total 
domestic demand – with serious costs in terms 
of growth – or by a shift of domestic demand 
from imports to domestically produced tradables 
and to non-tradables. The latter case requires, 
inter alia, a fall in the prices of non-tradables 
(relative to tradables). Overall, these 
considerations suggest that price flexibility in 
services is important for external adjustment 
even if services are not very tradable. They might 
be particularly relevant for the euro area where 
some Member States post large current account 
deficits which can no longer be curbed by 
changes in nominal exchange rates.  
6.  Services and the business cycle  
As shown in Graph 30, activity tends to be 
considerably less cyclical in services than in 
industry. The difference may be related to the 
structure of demand, with the more cyclical 
components of final demand – namely 
inventories, investment and exports – playing a 
comparatively much smaller role for services 
than for manufacturing.  
 
Table 10: Sectoral destination of production, euro area (1) 
(As a share of total sectoral production in % – 2000) 
 Sectoral destination  
Producing sectors (2) Industry Other goods Market services 
Non-market 
services Total services Total 
Industry 69.8 10.1 12.3 7.8 20.1 100 
Market services 14.3 5.6 72.6 7.5 80.1 100 
Non-market services 2.3 0.9 3.4 93.5 96.8 100 
Total services 10.9 4.3 52.8 32.0 84.8 100 
Other 16.6 65.4 11.6 6.5 18.0 100 
(1) The data are derived from an inverted input-output matrix (based on data for BE, DE, FR, IT, NL, AT and FI). The calculated shares take 
into account all indirect effects related to intermediate consumption.   
(2) Each row displays the sectoral destination of the production of a given sector (e.g; 20.1% of production in industry is shipped to services). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
tradables are estimated to account for 50% of cyclical 
fluctuations in real exchange rates in OECD countries.  
20  See for instance Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (2005), 
'Global current account imbalances and exchange rate 
adjustments', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
1:2005, pp.67-123.  
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Nevertheless, the picture of a relatively a-cyclical 
service sector should be nuanced. There is a 
broad heterogeneity in cyclical behaviours across 
different service sectors. Cyclical fluctuations are 
limited in the sectors where market forces do not 
play an important role such as 'government, 
community and personal services'. They tend to 
be much more pronounced in service sectors 
where market forces are more prominent. Over 
the past decade, sectors such as 'transport and 
communications' and 'hotel and restaurant' have 
actually experienced cyclical swings of a similar 
magnitude as industry. The cyclicality of market 
services is partly 'imported' from industry via 
intermediate consumption. However, it also 
results from factors that are specific to services. 
For instance, final demand for hotel and 
restaurant services is closely tied to developments 
in household income.  
Graph 30: Cyclical component of value added in 
industry and services, euro area (1980Q1-2005Q4) (1) 
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(1) Based on data for DE, FR, IT, ES, BE and FI. 
Source: Commission services. 
The shrinkage in cyclical volatility experienced in 
the euro area since the mid-1990s has been 
stronger in manufacturing than in services. Some 
services sectors such as 'transport and 
communications' and 'hotel and restaurant' have 
actually seen no reduction in volatility. The latest 
cyclical downturn points to some increasing 
degree of convergence in terms of scope of 
cyclical developments between manufacturing 
and services. 
Turning to business-cycle affiliations, Table 11 
displays the correlation of the business cycle of 
various service sectors with the economy's 
overall business cycle. Cycles in service sectors 
tend to be more correlated with the aggregate 
euro-area business cycle than with industry. They 
also tend to display stronger cyclical affiliations 
with each other than with industry.  
Table 11: Business cycle affiliations in the service 
sector, euro area (1980Q1 – 2005Q4) 
 
Correlation 
with overall 
cycle (1) 
(In %) 
Lead/lag 
(Number of 
quarters) (2)
   
Transport, 
communication, trade and 
hotels 
96 0 
Real estate, finance and 
business services 93 -1 
Government, community 
and personal services 77 -7 
Business sector services 98 0 
Total services 97 -1 
Industry 94 +1 
 (1) Correlation between the cyclical component of value added in 
the sector considered with the cyclical component of total value 
added in the economy for the 1980-2005 period. Various leads and 
lags were tested and the number shown corresponds to the highest 
correlation.  
(2) A negative number indicates that the sector considered is lagging 
the rest of the economy.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Activity in services lags the overall business cycle 
by about one quarter and the industrial cycle by 
two quarters. The lag is significantly longer in the 
case of the 'government, community and 
personal services' sector (about seven quarters) 
indicating a very slow (and muted) response of 
non-market sectors to the business cycle.  
7.  Concluding remarks  
Over the last three decades, the euro area, like 
other industrialised economies, has been 
undergoing a progressive shift of its production 
structure from goods to services. Given the 
specificities of services, this shift has potentially 
important consequences for the performance of 
the euro-area economy in terms of productivity, 
inflation and business cycle fluctuations. Services 
tend to be relatively sheltered from external or 
cyclical shocks. Price increases tend to be 
stronger and more persistent in services than in 
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manufacturing industry. Finally, although the 
sector is the mainstay of employment creation, it 
suffers from low and decelerating productivity 
gains.  
However, this focus has shown that all of these 
points should be qualified.  
Although the services sector as a whole is 
considerably more sheltered from global 
competition and cyclical fluctuations than 
industry, it exhibits a substantial degree of 
heterogeneity. Although services as a whole 
display a low openness to international trade, 
several sub-sectors export a large share of their 
production. And if public services are excluded, 
services also show a relatively high exposure to 
the business cycle with some sub-sectors 
experiencing cyclical fluctuations of the same 
magnitude as industry. This exposure to trade 
and the business cycle in some sectors is partly 
indirect, resulting from strong input-output 
linkages with industry.  
Although some service sectors are more exposed 
to international trade than others, the 
development of the sector as a whole still 
appears to be hindered by a lack of competition, 
which has contributed to the persistence of 
inflation and to the low productivity growth that 
have been the hallmark of the sector so far. 
Increased competition could therefore improve 
the sector's performance in these areas.  
Finally, the recent US experience shows that the 
shift to services does not necessarily entail a 
deceleration of productivity for the economy as a 
whole. There is room for dynamic services 
markets that contribute to both employment and 
productivity growth. However, this requires an 
adequate framework that fosters competition and 
allows services to innovate, restructure and make 
full use of the possibilities offered by information 
and communication technologies.  
In January 2004, the European Commission 
proposed a Directive on Services in the Internal 
Market that aimed at facilitating the provision of 
market services across the borders of the EU 
through reduced regulatory fragmentation and 
enhanced mutual recognition. It can be expected 
that an intensification of trade and FDI in 
services will in turn intensify competition in the 
sector, providing better value for money to final 
consumers and to producers using services as an 
input. Following the amendments voted by the 
European Parliament, in April 2006 the 
Commission put forward a revised proposal 
which almost completely removes the so-called 
'country of origin principle'. Although the 
removal of the 'country of origin principle' will 
reduce the overall impact of the Services 
Directive, according to currently available 
empirical analyses 70-90% of the gains expected 
from the original proposal would still be 
maintained in its revised version. Therefore, the 
final adoption and implementation of the revised 
Directive is urgently needed as successfully 
implemented reforms in services can offer 
important benefits. 
And it is not just regulatory changes that can 
make a difference. What matters is to inject new 
ICT capital into the economy and to 
complement this with the organisational and 
managerial changes needed to reap the full range 
of benefits associated with the introduction of 
ICT goods and services. As services depend 
increasingly on human capital rather than 
physical capital, changes in organisation and 
management will be crucial to ensure an efficient 
delivery of services. Mastering such know-how 
will be the key to exploiting the full potential of 
services in order to deliver new sources of 
growth and employment for the euro area. 
Overall, structural changes in service sectors 
would help improve the performance of the 
euro-area economy, in terms not only of 
productivity and growth but also its external 
competitiveness and resilience to economic 
disturbances.  
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